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Abstract
This paper analyzes a three-stage optimization problem in which
a …rm chooses (i) its technology, by deciding on a level of R&D, (ii)
whether this technology is to be used in a domestic or a in foreign plant
and (iii) the quantity produced and sold on the market. If technology
transfer costs are low, “high-tech” or R&D-intensive …rms tend to pro-
duce abroad. At higher technology transfer costs, high-tech …rms tend
to export. An empirical analysis using a data set of Swedish multina-
tional …rms, con…rms the latter prediction.
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11 Introduction and summary
In the literature, multinational …rms (MNFs), that is, …rms performing eco-
nomic activities in multiple countries, are closely related to …rm-speci…c
assets.1 Firm-speci…c assets, which includesuch thingsas marketing ability,
product di¤erentiation or Research and Development (R&D), can beseen as
giving a …rm a competitiveedge, which enables it to expand production into
foreign markets. Recent imperfect competitionmodelsofmultinationals also
show that …rms are more likely to choose foreign direct investment (FDI)
when …rm-level …xed costs, such as R&D expenditures, are high, relative to
plant level …xed costs. Seminal papers include Horstmann and Markusen
(1992), Brainard (1993), Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Markusen and
Venables (1998).
These models typically treat …rm-speci…c …xed assets as …xed vis-a-vis
the entry choice into a foreign market. However, when analyzing the re-
lationship between R&D and FDI, say, this assumption overlooks the fact
that a …rm may not only expand sales abroad in order to draw on its tech-
nology asset, it may also be done to gain resources to develop this asset.2 In
this paper, I therefore extend the earlier work by modelling this interaction.
Quitesurprisingly, this slight modi…cation of the standard model introduces
an ambiguity in the relationship between R&D and FDI. Even moresurpris-
ingly, I …nd empirical evidence suggesting a negative relationship, which is
quite the opposite of the traditional view.
I use a framework developed from Leahy and Neary (1996). I study a
monopoly …rm which makes three distinct choices: It invests in costly R&D
to improve its technology, thereby decreasing the marginal cost. Then, it
either implements the technology in an a¢liate which supplies the market
2from a foreign plant, or in a domestic plant which supplies the market by
export production. Given this location choice, the good is supplied.
The …rm takes thefact that export production is subject to a trade cost
into account. Moreover, I also assume that implementing the technology
abroad is more costly, dueto technology transfer costs.3 Themodel predicts
that when transfer costs are small, high-tech …rms will choose foreign direct
investment. At higher transfer costs, on the other hand, high-tech …rms
choose to export. High-tech or R&D-intensive …rms then gain more by
avoiding transfer costs of technology than by avoiding transport costs of
physical units, since more complex technology demands larger resources for
technology transfer.
These predictions are tested on a data set consisting of Swedish multi-
national …rms, provided by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics
(IUI) in Sweden. Both countries with foreign production and countries ex-
clusively supplied by exports, are included in a two-stage estimation proce-
dure, whereI use the share offoreign sales accounted forby overseas a¢liate
production as the dependent variable in the OLS-regressions. The empirical
analysis shows that exports is the preferred choice by R&D-intensive …rms:
There is a persistent negative correlation between R&D intensity and the
a¢liate shareof foreign sales, on the one hand, and the probability that any
a¢liate sales are recorded, on the other.
These …ndings may also be contrasted to some recent work. Contempo-
raneously to this paper, Sanna-Randaccio and Petit (1998) have developed
a similar framework in which investment in R&D leads …rms towards for-
eign expansion but also that MNFs tend to invest more in R&D. Sanna-
Randaccio and Petit also discuss transfer costs. On the basis that FDI
predominantly occurs between developed countries, they arguethat transfer
3costs should be small and derive the two-way relationship on this presump-
tion, predicting that high-tech …rms should be predominately multinational.
In contrast, thispapershows evidenceoftheoppositerelationship: high-tech
…rms are more inclined to export.
While the IUI data set has the advantage containing …rm-level informa-
tion, it is limited to …rms with producing a¢liates. How would then the
inclusion of purely exporting …rms a¤ect the results? This may reverse the
negative relationship between R&D and the probability of …nding a¢liates.
However, thenegative relationship between R&D and the a¢liate sharewill
not be a¤ected since this regression, by de…nition, only includes …rms with
producing a¢liates. Furthermore, it is informative makea comparison with
Brainard (1997). She employs thesame two-stage method to investigate the
pattern ofUS foreign production and exports, using a cross section ofindus-
tries and countries. Combining trade data from the US Bureau of Census
and FDI data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, she …nds that R&D
increases the probability of …nding a¢liate sales in a country. Based on her
theory, R&D is, however, not included in her second-stage regression. She
does however …nd that when levels of a¢liate production and exports are
separately regressed against R&D intensity; both increase in R&D, but the
elasticity of exports is about two and half times larger.4 She concludes that
R&D is consistent with both exports and foreign production but makes no
re‡ection to why the export bias is so strong. The mechanisms and results
of this paper may indeed be used to explain this pattern.
Some restrictions of the theoretical model should also be noted. The
model uses a monopoly set-up. This is purely for expositional reasons as
the results in this paper also extend into oligopoly. I model R&D as cost-
reducing, but the analysis can also be extended to quality improvements or
4the generation of new products. I abstract from any home market in‡uence
on the choice between FDI and exports. This assumption simpli…es the
analysis, but does not seem too restrictive when the focus is on a country
like Sweden, where the home-market may be of neglible size for its large in-
ternational …rms. Forfunctional forms, I use linearand quadraticfunctions.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, a theoretical framework is
derived. In Section 3, an empirical analysis based on the …ndings in section
2 is performed. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
In this section, I study the interaction between the R&D decision and the
choice between foreign and export production, as alternative means of serv-
ing a market abroad.
2.1 Structure
The structure of the problem is the following. There is a single …rm pro-
ducing a homogeneous good. The demand is located in another country,
which may be considered as the world market for the good in question. The
…rm makes three decisions: First, it invests in costly R&D at home. We
assume the technological level of the …rm to be represented by its cost level
of production, and that R&D lowers the marginal cost. Then, the tech-
nology is implemented either in export production from a domestic factory
(henceforth denoted E), or a direct investment is made (henceforth denoted
FDI) and production takes placein foreign a¢liate (henceforth denoted F).
Finally, the market is supplied.
For notation subscripts will denote location. For example, qh is the
5output choice of the …rm in location h, for h = fE; Fg: Hence, qE is the
export quantity of the …rm, whereas qF is the production quantity when an
a¢liate is established.
2.2 The model
The marginal cost in production in location h for h = fE; Fg, is given in
(1):
ch = Ch ¡µxh; CE = c0 +t; CF =c0 (1)
where µ and c0 are positive constants. Several factors a¤ect the production
costs. From (1), we can see that the …rm chooses levels of R&D, indicated
by xh, which lower its marginal costs. Export production is also subject to
a transport cost or a tari¤ barrier, t, which can be avoided by FDI.





where a > 0 is a demand parameter and s > 0 can be interpreted as a
measure of the size of the market.
The total pro…t can then be written as (3):









In (3), the …rst term indicates variable pro…ts and the last three terms
indicate di¤erent types of …xed costs. From the left to the right, these …xed
costs are as follows:
6First, R&D is assumed to incur quadratic costs, so that xh gives rise to
…rm-speci…c …xed costs of
°(xh)
2
2 , where ° is a positive constant.5 Note that
this term corresponds to …rm-speci…c costs discussed in the introduction,
which are usually modelled as exogenous in the literature. Here, these costs
are endogenous.
Second, the …rm is assumed to have production units at home, but initi-
ating production abroad involves additional plant-level investments. Plant-





G; for h =F
0; for h =E
(4)
Third, following Teece (1977), technology transfer costs for implement-
ing the technology in a factory located abroad are assumed to behigher. To
simplify, let us normalize such that new technology can be implemented at
home without cost, whereas an additional cost T of transferring the tech-
nology abroad arises, since it must be adapted to local conditions.
More complex technologies may require closer interchange of informa-
tion with manufacturing, thereby increasing communication and informa-
tion costs if production is located abroad. The transfer cost is therefore
made dependent on the actual level of R&D. This is done by introducing
a parameter ±, such that 0 · ±F < 1, if foreign production is chosen and
±E = 0, if export production is chosen. It simply means that a given level
of R&D, x, equally lowers the cost of production, irrespective of location
(cf. equation (1)), but that the implementation of the technology abroad
requires additional R&D e¤orts of ±x. From (3), we can then restate the







2 ¸ 0; for h =F
0; for h= E
(5)
where we note that T (¢) is indeed increasing with the level of R&D, x6.
Pro…t maximizing production quantities, qh, and R&D expenditures, xh,
are chosen so that (6) must hold:
@¦h
@qh









2 = 0 (6)
Using (2), and (6), optimal production quantities and optimal R&D levels








As shown by Leahy and Neary (1996), all endogenous variables can be





´ may then be interpreted as the relative return to R&D. Note that
´ is zero, if R&D is completely ine¤ective (µ =0), inexcessively expensive
(° =1) or if the size of the market is very small (s =0):
To ensure well-behaved solutions, we will make two assumptions: (i)
The parameter values are such that the …rm always have a strict positive
marginal cost which, by (1), implies that ch >µxh holds. (ii) Theparameter
values support positivepro…ts in both locations. This, in turn, implies cases






8By using (1), (7), (9) , I can express the optimal production level for








where it will be assumed that A ¡t > 0 and A =a¡c0 >0.8
We can then use (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (10), for deriving expressions
for the total pro…ts in the two alternative locations. Then, we have:











2 (2¡®´) ¡T ¡G
where variablepro…tsaredenoted ¼h(´) and production quantities aregiven
by (10).
2.2.1 The equilibrium location
Let us now characterize the equilibrium location of production. It is then
useful to explore the variable pro…t function. It is easy to state and prove
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The variable pro…t for exporting ¼(´) is increasing and
the corresponding pro…t in foreign production ¼F (´) increasing or non-
decreasing in the relative return to R&D, ´: Furthermore, de…ne ® = ~ ®
as a critical value of technology transfer costs. Then, a¢liate pro…ts ¼E (´)
increase at a faster rate in ´, compared to export pro…ts ¼E (´) if transfer
cost are su¢ciently low, ® > ~ ®. The opposite holds if transfer costs are
su¢ciently high, ®< ~ ®.
9Proof. See appendix A
What is theeconomicintuition behind proposition 1? First, thepro…t in
export and foreign production increases in ´ simply because a higher return
to R&D implies higher spending on R&D, thereby lowering the marginal
costs.
Moreover, since FDI avoids the transport cost, larger sales in foreign
production also imply increased spending on R&D, as compared to the al-
ternativeofexports. Therefore, thedi¤erencein marginal costsbetween the
two location alternatives will tend to exceed the transport cost t, and this
di¤erence will be increasing in ´. This trade-cost-e¤ect will work towards
making pro…ts in a¢liate production more responsive to a increase in the
relative return to R&D ´. However, locating production abroad impliesthat
technology need to be transferred from home R&D labs to abroad. At an
increasing relative return to R&D ´, increasing technology transfer costs
tend to restrict the …rm’s R&D which, in turn, limits the reduction of the
marginal cost if a¢liate production ischosen. This transfer cost-e¤ect tends
to make pro…ts in export production more responsive to a increase in the
relative return to R&D ´
Which location of production is then actually chosen? Comparing total
pro…ts in the two alternatives, the following proposition applies.
Proposition 2 Suppose that parameter values are such are such that total
pro…ts are equal in export- and a¢liate production at some ´¤. If technology
transfer costs are low ® > ~ ®, then a …rm endowed with a high relative
return to R&D, ´ >´¤ chooses FDI, whereas the …rm exports if ´ < ´¤: The
opposite holds if technology transfer cost are high, ®< ~ ®.
Proof. See appendix A
10Accordingly, the model predicts that when transfers of technology is
less costly, …rms in knowledge-intensive industries, that is, industries with a
relatively high relative return to R&D ´, are inclined to locate production
abroad, while …rms in industries with a lower return to R&D choose to
export. On the other hand, when it is more costly to transfer technology,
high-tech …rms tend to export whereas low-tech …rms choose FDI. In the
latter case, high-tech …rms gain more by avoiding transfer costs than by
avoiding transport costs of physical units. These results are summarized in
table 1.
Thetable also showscomparative statics result for both cases of transfer
costs. The explicit expressions are given in appendix A. The …rst column
indicates an increase in the exogenous variable z. The second and third
columns revealsthe e¤ect in thecaseoflow transfer costs. Morespeci…cally,
the second column shows the qualitative e¤ect on ´¤; whereas the third
column translates this into the “marginal e¤ect” on the …rm’s incentive to
choose FDI and locate production abroad9. This sign can be interpreted as
the e¤ect onthe location decision in a marginal …rm endowed with a relative
return to R&D of ´¤. Column three and four does the same thing for the
case with high transfer costs.
Thecomparativestatics results in table 1 reveal no surprises, so I will be
very briefin commenting on them. Whatever the size of transfer costs, FDI
is less likely when plant-level …xed costs G are higher and more likely when
transfer costs are lower (® is larger) and when trade barriers t are higher.
For example, in the low transfer cost case, an increase in t will lower ´¤
and induce the marginal …rm to produce abroad. In this case, the marginal
cost in a¢liate production doesnot only decrease dueto increased transport
costs, but also due to the fact that a more extensive production increases
11R&D expenditures. These e¤ects magnify the di¤erence in marginal costs
between export and a¢liate production, which, in turn, allows pro…ts in
these two alternatives to be equalized at a lower return to R&D ´¤. Hence,
higher transport costs favor FDI, since a larger range of ´ permits direct
investment.
3 Empirical analysis
The theoretical section gives an ambiguous view of the relation between
a …rm’s technology and its choice between a¢liate and export production.
Since di¤erent predictions arise depending on the importance or level of
technology transfer costs, this provides an opportunity to test theimpact of
technology transfer cost.
3.1 Data
The primary data source is a data set from theResearch Institute of Indus-
trial Economics (IUI), based on a questionnaire sent to all Swedish MNFs
every fourth year, on average. Data is available from seven surveys: 1965,
1970, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990 and 1994. Thesurvey covers almost all Swedish
multinational …rms in the manufacturing sector, and detailed information
is available on variables such as R&D, employment, production and their
distribution between domestic and foreign units, as well as on internal and
external trade ‡ows.
This rich data set has been used in the following way: (i) All …rms with
at least one production a¢liate abroad are included in the sample. (ii)
Within this set of …rms with production a¢liates, we focus on foreign sales
to the OECD countries.10 (iii) All exports sales are sales of …nal goods, that
12is, the impact of input goods is removed. (iv) Exports back to Sweden from
the a¢liates have been removed from a¢liate production.
Let me brie‡y comment on these conditions. Ideally, …rms without pro-
duction a¢liates should be included in the sample, but corresponding …rm-
level data forpurely exporting …rms is simply not available. I have chosen to
focus on OECD countries, since the modelling framework does not empha-
size di¤erences in factor costs. In addition, sales to OECD countries cover
the vast majority of foreign sales in these …rms. Finally, the last two crite-
ria are chosen to comply with the absence of input-goods and home-market
e¤ects in the theoretical section.
Additional information on country and industry speci…c variables are
taken from World Development Indicators (1997), OECD (1997) and SCB.
3.2 The econometric model
Thetheory presented in theprevioussection predictsa …rm’s choicebetween
implementing its technology in export or a¢liate production. In translat-
ing this theoretical prediction into an empirical analysis, there are several
caveats: Thesimplemodel involvesa …rm whichproducesa single…nal prod-
uct, whereas many of the …rms in the sample are large multi-a¢liate …rms
with multiple product lines. Furthermore, within such …rms, thelocation of
technology cannot bedirectly observed from thedata. I will follow Brainard
(1997) and use the shareof foreign sales accounted for by thea¢liates as my





where SQijt denotes the level of production for …rm i in country j at time
t and SXijt is the corresponding export level. This relative measure then
13indirectly captures the implementation choices of the …rms since the sales
pattern must re‡ect location choices. It also subsumes the two endogenous
variables, export and a¢liate production, into a single variable.
The dependent variable in (13) is censured - it can take on any values
between zero and one. A closer look at the data set reveals that the …rms
only haveproduction a¢liatesina minority ofthecountriesfor which foreign
sales are recorded. Thus, AFSHAREijt contains a large number of zeros.
Omitting theseobservations will result in a systematicselection bias causing
any OLS-estimates on AFSHAREijt to be both biased and inconsistent.
Therefore, I will use a two-stage procedure. This procedure, given by (14)
and (15), separates the probability- and marginal e¤ects:
DAFSHAREijt = ¯0 +¯1RDit +¯2TREMBht +¯3DISTj (14)
+¯4AGE1it +¯5RD2it +¯6GSCALE1ht
+¯7GDPjt +Àijt
AFSHAREijt = ®0 +®1RDit +®2TREMBht +®3DISTj (15)
+®4AGE2ijt +®5RD2it +®6GSCALE2ht
+®7GDPjt +®8¸ijt +"ijt
I …rst estimate the probability of …nding a¢liate sales in a country, us-
ing the dependent variable DAFSHAREijt, where DAFSHAREijt = 1 if
AFSHAREijt > 0, DAFSHAREijt = 0 otherwise. Then, a two-stage se-
lection biased corrected regression model from Heckman (1979) is employed,
where the error correction variable ¸ijt is included. The explanatory vari-
ables are presented below. Logs are also used in all continuous variables.
143.3 Exogenous variables
In table 1, the independent variables and the corresponding exogenous vari-
ables from the theoretical section (for which they act as proxies), are pre-
sented. For convenience, I also reproduce their expected sign, based on my
…ndings in the theoretical section. Two kinds of independent variables will
be used; core variables and additional variables.
3.3.1 Core variables
This group of independent variables is closely attached to the exogenous
variables encountered in the theoretical section. R&D intensity, RDit, de-
…ned as the share of R&D expenditures in the total sales of the …rm, is
used as a proxy for the relative return to R&D, ´. Since the focus in this
paper is on the relation between technology and location, RDit is the ex-
planatory variable of most interest.11. Note that since R&D expenditures
are endogenously determined in the theoretical section, there may be an
endogenity problem with the R&D variable in the empirical analysis. The
structure in our theoretical models - in which R&D expenditures are set be-
fore location decision and market interaction - suggests that a lagged R&D
intensity should beconsidered. Ravenscraft andScherer(1982) proposealag
of approximately …ve years between R&D expenditures and pro…ts, which
suggests that the four-year lag, corresponding the one period lag in terms of
surveys, should be treated as endogenous. To reduce any simultaneity bias,
the eight year lag on R&D intensity will be used instead12.
However, since two surveys are lost in the lag procedure, and because of
unbalanced nature of the data set as many …rms disappear when they are
acquired or reorganized over time, I will also report estimations, using the
15present R&D intensity. Thisavoidsa massiveloss ofobservations associated
with the eight-year lag. Note also that given that R&D is conducted before
any market interaction, R&D intimet shouldbeuncorrelated with theerror
terms in (14) and (15).
Unfortunately, no direct measure of the plant level …xed costs G can be
calculated, as the data base lacks information on individual plants in the
Swedish part of the corporation. Information on plant size is available for
a¢liates, but using thisinformation without caregives riseto two immediate
problems: (i) If plant-level scale economies are su¢ciently large, then we
would suspect that domesticproductionis preferred, thereby indicating that
proxies for G based solely on a¢liate information may be misleading. (ii)
Relating large a¢liate plants directly to AFSHARE may give a spurious
correlation - large a¢liates should account for a large share of foreign sales,
a relationship which may have littleto do with the e¤ect of scale economies
on the location decision.
In the probit equation (14), I will use GSCALE1it. It is de…ned as the
ratio between the average number of employees in a¢liates and the average
number of employees in the corporations. To reduce the above problems, I
aggregate to the three- or four-digit industry level. The OLS stage should
be more sensitive, however, since it directly uses the continuous variable
AFSHARE; whereas the probit stage involves the dichotomous variable
DAFSHARE. Therefore, equation (15) uses GSCALE2it, which is instead
calculated from Swedish industrial statistics. It isde…ned astheaveragesize
of plants with more than one hundred employees divided by total industry
meansize, at thethree- orfour-digit industry level to whichthe…rm belongs.
Turning to measures of transport costs, TREMBit is calculated as the
share of transport and packing costs in total variable costs, and once more,
16Swedish three- or four-digit industry level data are used. In addition to
packing and transport costs, total variable costs include costs for electric-
ity, raw materials and wages for blue-collar workers. The second measure,
DISTWjt, is an index measuring the geographical distance from Sweden to
the respective countries.
It is very di¢cult to …nd a variable which accurately captures the ef-
fect of technology transfer costs. Following Swedenborg (1982), it may be
argued that more experience of production abroad should lower technology
transfer costs to unitsabroad, and that this should also be the case for…rms
performing R&D abroad13. To capture the e¤ects of experience in foreign
production, AGE1it re‡ects a weighted averageof the age of thea¢liates of
a …rm, irrespective of their location. AGE2ijt is simply the mean age of the
a¢liates in a particular country. To measure the e¤ects of R&D abroad, we
construct two dummy variables; RD1it takes on the value of one, ifthe …rm
performs any R&D abroad, and RD2ijt, which takes on the value of one if
the …rm performs any R&D in the country in question.
3.3.2 Control variables
In addition to the core variables, a set of control variables will also be
included. The …rst control variable is the size of the respective country
measured as PPP-adjusted, de‡ated GDP, GDPjt.14 Following Brainard
(1997), I also control for di¤erences in factor proportions through the vari-
able INCOMEjt, measuring per capita income di¤erences between Sweden
and the respective countries where the …rm operates. OPENjt is an open-
ness index taken from Wheeler and Moody (1992), measuring the openness
of a country to FDI. Finally, following Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996),
17I control for the in‡uence of agglomeration e¤ects on the location decision
through the variable AGGLOMhjt. This variable is de…ned as the share of
all employees in the manufacturing industry in the industry to which the
investing …rm belongs, out of all employees in the manufacturing sector in
the respective countries, divided by the share of employment in this sector
in all countries. If pecuniary externalities in terms of cost and demand link-
ages are present in an industry, thereby attracting direct investments, such
agglomeration forces should be captured by this variable.15 Finally, I also
control for speci…c e¤ects over regions, industries and time. The regions are
EFTA, the EC, North America and the Far East. Industry dummies are
employed at the two- or three-digit industry level.
3.4 Estimation results
Table 3 reports the results from estimating (14) and (15). Speci…cation (i),
uses thecontemporaneousR&D intensity, whereas speci…cation (ii) uses the
eight-year lag on R&D intensity. The …rst two columns shows the probabil-
ity and marginal e¤ects, whereas the third column shows a 2SLS estimation
on equation (15) where the error correction variable is omitted. The con-
tempemperaneous R&D-intensity is used as instrument for the fouryear lag
in R&D-intensity in speci…cation (i). The eight-year lag on R&D intensity is
used as an instrument for the four yearlag in R&D-intensity in speci…cation
(ii).
Irrespectiveofspeci…cation, boththeprobability- e¤ect and themarginal
e¤ect are signi…cantly negative for RDINT. This is also the case for the
2SLS estimates. That is, the larger the R&D intensity, the smaller the
probability that a …rm locates production in a country and - given that
18production is established - thesmaller is the shareof foreign sales accounted
for by the a¢liates. Note that this negative, signi…cant sign lends supports
the relationship predicted when transfer costs were assumed to be high,
thereby rejecting the prediction when transfer costs were assumed to be
low.
Turning to transport costs, TREMB has the predicted, positive sign in
all equations. DIST is statistically signi…cant, but appears with di¤erent
signs in the probit and the regressions. Thus, when the geographical dis-
tance increases, the probability of a …rm locating production in a country
decreases, whereas - given that a¢liates are established - a larger distance
favors local production. The latter result is predicted in the theory section,
whereas the former is somewhat unexpected. As Ekholm (1998) argues, it
may be the case that a largerdistancealso re‡ectscultural and institutional
factors, in which case the increasing cost of FDI dominates the e¤ects of
transport costs.
Variables AGE1; RD1 and GSCALE1 all have the predicted signs in
the probit stage in both speci…cations. Hence, more experience in foreign
production clearly increases the probability of producing abroad, whereas
scale economies at the plant-level work in the opposite way. Turning to the
regressions, the corresponding variables, AGE2;RD2 and GSCALE2, re-
veal similar information. Thus, if the…rm has established R&D laboratories
in a host country, this obviously facilitates transfers of technology and pro-
duction to such a country. We also note that a sample selection bias indeed
exists, as the coe¢cient on LAMBDA is positive and highly irrespective of
speci…cation.
The GDP-variable GDP exerts a signi…cant positive in‡uence - the size
of a country is of great importance for a …rm’s decision to establish produc-
19tion. Turning to thesecond-stage regressions, once a¢liates areestablished,
local production seemsbechosen overexports to a larger extent, when coun-
try sizeincreases. Overall, theOLS and 2SLS estimationsprovidequiteclose
results. The only exception is the GDP-variable, where the 2SLS estima-
tions suggest that …rms on the margin favors to export to large countries
rather than produce locally. This is somewhat surprising, but suggests that
size of country has a stable in‡uence on a …rm’s decision to establish pro-
duction, whereas the e¤ect is less clear once production has already been
established.16
3.4.1 Robustness of results
Table 4 checks the robustness of the results in table 3 by …rst adding more
control variables. Speci…cation (iii) reestimates (14) and (15), adding the
three new variables: INCOME, OPEN and AGGLOM. The parameter
estimates arequiterobust to theinclusion of the extra variables. In particu-
lar, thenegativerelationship between R&D intensity andforeign production,
as measured by DAFSHARE and AFSHARE, persists.
The coe¢cients on INCOME, proxying for di¤erences in relative fac-
tor endowments, does not seem to a¤ect the probability of …nding a¢liates,
but is positive and signi…cant in the OLS. Hence, within this set of OECD
countries, factor proportions seem to explain some of the variation in the
dependent variable once a¢liates are established: The openness of a coun-
try to FDI has the positive predicted sign, but is not signi…cant. Finally,
pecuniary externalities in the shape of cost and demand linkages in the
host countries seem important, as AGGLEM signi…cantly increases both
the share of foreign sales of the a¢liates and the probability of establishing
20production.
Next, I undertake panel estimations controlling for …rm-speci…c e¤ects,
sinceunobservable…rm-characteristicsmay drivetheresults. Inspeci…cation
(iv), I reestimate augmentedversions of(14) and (15) separately, controlling
for …rm-speci…c, time-speci…c and country-speci…ce¤ects. To allow for …xed
e¤ects, I use a logit formulation in (14). Sincethereis no within-variation in
the distance variable, DISTj and the openness measure for FDI, OPENj,
thesevariables are dropped. I choose to use thepresent R&D intensity in all
speci…cations. This allows me to exploit the full time-series variation of the
data. It also avoids a large loss of observations associated with using lagged
R&D as the data is heavily unbalanced. The panel results in speci…cation
(iv) produce no drastic changes. In particular, there is again a negative
correlation between R&D intensity and the propensity to produceabroad as
measured by either the a¢liateshare of foreign sales or theprobability that
any a¢liate sales are recorded. This is also the case for speci…cation (v),
which controls for …rm-country-pair …xed e¤ects and time-speci…c e¤ects.
4 Conclusions and discussion
In the literature, high R&D intensity is often associated with multinational
…rms. It should then be expected that higher R&D intensity should lead
…rms to choose overseas production relative to exporting. In this paper, I
have shown that this is not necessarily the case. On the contrary, using a
unique data set of Swedish multinational …rms, I …nd that R&D intensity is
negatively related to the share of foreign sales accounted for by thea¢liates
on the one hand, and the probability of …nding a¢liate production in a
country on theother. That is, onthemargin, thereisa negativerelationship
21between technology and overseas production. I have suggested that oneway
to explain this puzzle is to take into account that it is costly to transfer
technology abroad. R&D intensive …rms may then …nd it more pro…table to
avoid technology transfer costs rather than physical transport costs.
This also points to a natural extension of the analysis, since a way for
a …rm to avoid technology transfer costs associated with foreign production
could beto placethedevelopment ofits technology abroad. Based on earlier
studiesofSwedish MNFs, however, adapting technologiesto local conditions
and regulations rather than developing new technology, seems to have been
the primary motive for locating R&D abroad.17 But it should benoted that
the average share of R&D performed abroad has increased from around 9
% in the early observations to 25 % in the latest. While this shows that
the major part of R&D still takes place at home, the increasing share of
foreign R&D might also indicate that R&D to a larger extent takes place
abroad to develop new products and technologies. Future research should
therefore investigate the interaction of the production- and R&D location
more closely.
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26A Appendix:
First, the statements in propositions 1 and 2 are proved, then table 5 is
derived. Finally, second-order conditions are shown.













which veri…es the …rst part of proposition. Then, de…ne the di¤erence in
variable pro…ts as 4¼ = ¼E ¡¼F . From (A.1), it is easy to see that ® =
0 (in…nite transfer costs) implies
@4¼
@´ > 0, whereas ® = 1 (no transfer
costs) implies
@4¼
@´ < 0: Also note that (A.1) implies that
@4¼
@´ must be
monotonously decreasing in ®: Hence, there is a critical ® = ~ ®; such that
@4¼(´:~ ®)
@´ =0: This veri…es the second part of the proposition.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
First, de…ne the di¤erence in total pro…ts as 4¦ = ¦E ¡¦F where ¦E




@´ . Then, if there is a
´ = ´¤ such that 4¦(´¤; z) = 0 , ¦E (´¤; z) = ¦F (´¤;z); where z is the
vector of exogenous variables, it follows from theproof in proposition 1 that
¦E < ¦F for ´ >´¤ and ®> ~ ®, whereas ¦E > ¦F for ´ >´¤ and ® < ~ ®:
27A.3 Comparative statics in table 1
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A.4 Appendix: Second-order conditions
In this appendix, we check the …rm’s second-order conditions for the maxi-
mization of (3). To have a well-posed maximization problem, the Hessian,








where, for example, ¦h;qh;xh = @2¦h
@qh@xh. This, in turn, requires that jQhj >








® ¡´); ¦F;qF ;qF =¡2
s <0; ¦F;xF;xF = ¡®° <0
28Notes
1See Dunning (1977) and Markusen (1995).
2This have been been suggested by Caves (1996).
3Teece (1977) provides strong evidence for the existence of such technol-
ogy transfer costs.
4Brainard …nds that the elasticity of a¢liate sales with regard to R&D
is 0:1840. The corresponding elasticity for exports is 0:4599. Hence, the
a¢liate share of foreign sales should decrease in R&D intensity.
5See Cheng (1984).
6The assumption of a quadratic transfer cost is not essential. What is
important is that the transfer cost in‡uences the level of R&D, x.
7In appendix A.4, it is shown that the latter assumption guarantees that
the second-order condition for the …rm’s maximization of (3) is ful…lled.
8These conditions are necessary in order to guarantee that production is
pro…table.
9A decrease in ´¤ is indicated by a minus sign, an increase in ´¤ by a
plus sign.
10The countries included are: Belgium, France, Italy, Holland, Germany,
Luxemburg, UK, Norway, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Fin-
land, Austria, Switzerland, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia andNewZealand.
The last two countries are combined into one single country observation.
2911It can beshown that R&D intensity, de…ned as the share ofR&D expen-
ditures in total sales, is positively correlated with our theoretical measure
of return to R&D, ´.
12The eight-year lag is constructed by lagging R&D two surveys back.
This produces eight-year lags for most observations. The exception is 1986,
where the lag is taken from 1974. Similarly, the four-year lag used in 1986
is taken from the 1978 survey. I have taken thisapproach because no survey
was undertaken in 1982.
13R&D performed at homecompletely dominatestotal R&D expenditures
in the…rms ofthis sample, even though the share ofR&D performed abroad
has increased over the period.
14Thereasonwhy sizeisonly used asa control variableisthat sis included
in the de…nition of ´, and therefore a¤ects the R&D intensity. But since I
aim at capturing the implementation choices of new technologies through
AFSHARE, it is still necessary to control for size e¤ects.
15This type of externalities may involve the use of joint networks of sup-
pliers and distributions (see, for example, Venables (1996)).
16There is a similar pattern in table 4 where a comparison is made with
panel analysis
17See, for example, Fors (1997).
30Table 1: Description of variables.
Variable Proxy Expected Description and
name for sign source
RDINT ´ share of a …rm’s total R&D expenditures in its
total sales, lagged eight years in speci…cation (ii) and
(vi) present intensity in speci…cations (i), (iii)-(v)
and (vii). (IUI).
TREMB t + share of transport and packing costs in total
variable costs divided by the total industry mean
at the three- or four-digit level in the Swedish industry
to which the …rm belongs (SCB).
DIST t + distance from Sweden to the respective countries
where the …rm records foreign sales. (IUI).
AGE1 ® + weighted average of the mean age of the …rm’s
a¢liates in the respective countries where
production takes place. Weights calculated as the
share of the …rm’s total foreign sales attributed
to the individual countries. (IUI).
RD1 T + dummy variable that takes on the value of one if
the …rm undertakes any R&D abroad, zero
otherwise. (IUI).
GSCALE1 G ¡ average size of the a¢liates divided by the
average size of the …rms in terms of employees
at the three- or four-digit industry level to
which the …rm belongs. (IUI).
31Table 2: Continued
Variable Proxy Expected Description and
name for sign source
AGE2 ® + mean age of a …rm’s a¢liates in a speci…c
country. (IUI).
RD2 ® + dummy variable that takes on the value of one if
the …rm undertakes any R&D in a country,
zero otherwise. (IUI).
GSCALE2 G ¡ average size of plants with more than one hundred
employees divided by total industry mean size
at the three- or four-digit level Swedish industry,
to which the …rm belongs. (SCB).
GDP PPP-adjusted, de‡ated GDP.
(OECD, World Bank).
INCOME ratio between PPP-adjusted, de‡ated GDP
per capita in Sweden and the respective
countries where the …rm records foreign
sales. (OECD, World Bank).
OPEN index measuring the openness of a country to FDI.
(Wheeler and Moody (1992)).
AGGLEM share of total employment in an industry at
the three- or four-digit industry level in the
respective countries where a …rm records
foreign sales. (Braunerhjelm and Svensson
(1996) and OECD).
Note: Column two describes the exogenous variable to which the proxy refers.
As the theoretical section involves two models with both di¤erent variables and
di¤erent predictions, the top row for each exogenous variable corresponds to
model 1, whereas the bottom row corresponds to model 2.
32Table 3: Two-stage Heckman estimation and 2SLS.
Variables Speci…cation (i) Speci…cation (ii)
Probit OLS 2SLS Probit OLS 2SLS
RDINT -0.104 -0.251 -0.333 -0.116 -0.173 -0.236
(-4.107) (-11.095) (-9.775) (-3.274) (-5.311) (-5.102)
TREMB 0.020 0.085 0.097 0.095 0.088 0.114
(0.386) (2.400) (2.448) (1.120) (1.737) (2.104)
DIST -0.566 0.123 0.381 -0.511 0.213 0.419







AGE2 0.114 0.125 0.146 0.126
(7.278) (5.762) (5.613) (4.948)
RD2 0.263 0.254 0.167 0.204
(6.718) (5.386) (3.187) (3.737)
GSCALE2 -0.947 -0.108 -0.213 -0.320
(-1.787) (-1.466) (-1.989) (-2.964)
GDP 0.347 0.061 -0.040 0.390 0.124 -0.023







2 25.4 23.6 30.4 29.0
F 13.15 11.55 8.92 9.30
No. of var. 26 27 25 24 25 24
No. of obs. 4283 1462 1065 2102 797 775
Note 1: The dependent variable in the OLS columns is the a¢liates share of foreign
sales for …rm i in country j at time t. The dependent variable in the probit columns is
a dummy variable which equals one if production is registered, zero otherwise. In the
2SLS regressions, the eight year lag- and the present intensity are respectively used as
instruments for the four year lag in R&D-intensity.
Note 2: Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. Prediction errors are formed at acritical
probability of 0.5. All variables are in logs, except RD1, RD2 and LAMBDA. Sample
size di¤erences re‡ect missing observations. Intercept and dummies for region, industry
and time are not shown for Speci…cations (ii) and (iii).
33Table 4: A comparison with panel analysis.
Variables Speci…cation (iii) Speci…cation (iv) Speci…cation (v)
Probit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS
RDINT -0.111 -0.235 -0.311 -0.204 -0.578 -0.112
(-4.163) (-10.478) (-2.430) (-4.327) (-2.684) (-2.696)
TREMB 0.013 0.067 -0.211 0.092 0.152 0.129
(0.259) (1.829) (-0.875) (1.128) (0.401) (1.743)
DIST -0.453 0.173
(-6.979) (3.406)
AGE1 0.236 0.203 0.511
(10.246) (2.225) (3.432)
RD1 0.215 0.293 0.794
(3.806) (1.620) (2.517)
GSCALE1 -0.288 -0.257 -1.808
(-7.526) (-1.809) (-4.233)
AGE2 0.126 0.106 0.058
(6.353) (5.385) (2.455)
RD2 0.255 0.201 0.195
(6.420) (3.976) (3.477)
GSCALE2 -0.075 -0.138 -0.115
(-1.445) (-2.341) (-2.241)
GDP 0.319 0.048 1.078 -0.166 2.215 -0.484
(11.574) (1.920) (1.023) (-0.409) (1.080) (-1.115)
INCOME -0.011 0.127 -0.014 0.122 0.105 -0.015
(-0.120) (1.900) (-0.068) (1.507) (0.247) (-0.174)
OPEN 0.200 0.009
(1.346) (0.086)
AGGLOM 0.139 0.181 0.216 0.129 -0.517 0.282
(2.208) (3.487) (1.694) 2.137) (-0.903) (1.673)
LAMBDA 0.553
(5.885)
Prediction 23.7 34.5 39.4
errors (%)
Chi2 699.90 635.65 102.90
R
2 26.6 20.9 0.2
F 11.58 9.39 3.98
No. of var. 28 29 32 32 14 15
No. of obs. 3811 1343 3716 1285 696 1040
No. groups 177 141 186 319
34Table 5: Comparative statics results in model 1
Low transfer costs, ®> ~ ®: High transfer costs, ® < ~ ®:
(FDI when ´ > ´¤) (FDI when ´ <´¤)
Variable: E¤ect on ´¤ ME on FDI E¤ect on ´¤ ME on FDI
G (+) - (-) -
® (-) + (+) +
t (-) + (+) +
Note: Note that an increase in alfa implies a decrease in tech-
nology transfer costs.
35